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IN THE SIJPREME COtJRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
qATF OF llTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

-v-

19092

RAYF:c;,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant,

Leonardo Rayes, was charged by

1otormation with Aggravated Robbery,

a

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

felony

in the first

"76-6-302

(1953 as

om ended l.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On March 10, 19R3,
10 the Third Judicial

appellant was tried before a

District,

r.ilkinson,

presiding.

Roht'.€ry,

first degree felony,

a

:njeterm1nate term of
0

jury

the Honorable Homer F.

Appellant was convicted of Aggravated

five years

ri son to run consecutively with

and sentenced

to an

to life at the Utah State
the sentence he was

then

1 nq.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Resµondent
trie

seeks an order of

Ju<igment and sentence of the

this Court affirming

trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
on the evening of September 20,

lC!R2, Pichard

Bullock was the only attendant on duty at the oua 11 ty r>i I . 1a
station and convenience store at 3qoo south qon fast.

Mr.

Bullock was in the back room at approximately g:nn p.m. when
two men entered the store.

Mr. Bullock returned to the cas•

register and the two men approached him.

One pointed a gun at_

Mr. Bullock and ordered him to lie down on the floor,
did (T.

lq).

which

The two men emptied the cash register and fler1

from the station.

Mr. Bullock then got up and called the

police.
This entire incident was witnessed by flecky Edwarcls.
Ms. Edwards was just leaving the store with her young dau:1hter
as the two men entered.

Because the attendant was

in the bacf.

room and the two men looked suspicious, Ms. F:dwards paid
particular attention to the two (T. 42-44).

She returnerl to

her car at the gas pumps and from there watched the entire
robbery (T. 45-46).
Both Mr. Bullock and Ms.

F:dwards were able to

accurately identify appellant as one of the rob be rs.

Mr.

Bullock identified him as

(T.

the man who pointed the gun

711.

Mr. Bullock gave police a description of the robbers wh1rh
included what they wore (T.
(T.

20).

lA) and an accent

in their speec.

The day after the robbery, police showed Mr.

a book of nearly 200 photographs from which he
appellant as one of the robbers (T. 55-SR).

-2-

riul I·

ident if iPri

Ms.

F:dwar<is q.,·: 1

similar description of

the

robbers'

clothes

(T.

identified appellant from the same photo book
·'1-f (I).

Mr.

Bullock and Ms.

1,, tne courtroom (T.

21,

iientifie<i co-defendant

F.dwards also

47);

4 3)

(T.

identified appellant

hoth witnesses accurately

Ibr1an Ortiz as

the other robber (T.

h 1j-f' 1 I •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S CHIEF
WITNESS WAS PROPERLY RFSTRICTED TO
MATFRIAL AND RELEVANT ISSUES.
Appellant

contends that

restricted cross-examination of

the

trial

judge improperly

the state's chief witness

regarrling eyewitness identification.

He claims that certain

;uest ions concerning the witness's awareness of reports on
'"1stak.en identification, which were not
·•ould have gone

to the credibility of

:ontent ion is without merit.

permitted at

the witness.

in

'i64

Section 12 of

the sixth Amendment of the United

'tat es Constitution which assures
elate v. Maestas, ritah,

This

"The right to cross-examination

is an invaluable right embodied in Article I,
tne 1:tah Constitution and

trial,

the right

P.2d 13A6,

to confrontation."

13R7 (l'l77).

This

:•nst1tut i<>nally protected right of cross-examination,
'•ever·. rl"es
t

ldflS."

not entitle a defendant
State v.

Clayton,

- 3-

"to embark on fishing

Utah, 658 P.2d 621,

623

(1983).
first

The Clayton Court required that a founr1at1nn must

be established upon which

to hase the re>levancy

questions during cross-examination.

Without

such

,,f

founriat l"r',

appellant's cross-examination of the prosecution witness
not

improperly restricted.

Wri'

Id.

As appellant accurately states
cross-examination allows the defendant

in his brief,

an opportunity to

impeach the truthfulness and impartiality,

the capacity to

observe, and the consistency of the witness.
Evidence (2d Cleary Ed. 1972)

McCormick,

22 at 49.

Appellant

Dur i ng the tr i a 1 , Mr .

fully utilized this opportunity.

Bullock, the State's eyewitness, was subject to thorough
cross-examination concerning his

identification of appellant.

Mr. Bullock answered numerous questions concerning appellant's
skin color and facial

features

(T.

24-30), Spanish accent IT.

31), and Mr. Bullock's own certainty of his identification IT.
33-34).

The witness's answers

in cross-examination apparent]_,

served to establish to the jurors'

satisfaction the accuracy

of his eyewitness identification.
This Court recently established guidelines by wh1cc,
to consider eyewitness identification in State v. Malmrose,
Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982).

The Court held that reliability o'

identification must be viewed

"in light of the totality of

circumstances," including the witness's opportunity to v1Pw
the defendant, the witness's degree of attention during the

-4-

the accuracy and certainty of the witness's
trlPntiflcation, and the
rrie identification.

length of time

Id.

0

See also Niel v.

at 'i9.

Restated,

the

Biggers, 4oq

issue of credibility focuses

thP circumstances surrounding

,,

between the crime and

the

illegal act and the

.ntness's ability to observe and recall the situation.
Arpellant

cites several cases

in his

brief as

of a rever-sal when cross-examination has been
Each of these cases, however,

restricted.

11st1nguished from the present case.
1tat1 2qf;,
thP

2'iq

P.

1044 ( 1927),

tnal JUd<Je refused

State v.

involved a situation in which

restriction of cross-examination

is clearly violative of defendant's right
10.w,er, the

Zolantakis, 70

to pennit any cross-examination of the

Such total

State's witness.

is easily

Zolantakis opinion

is

to confrontation.

inapplicable to the present

case wherein appellant was allowed cross-examination.
People v.

Clark,

47 Cal.

Rptr.

3fl2,

407

P.2d 294

1)%SI, and Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10
2d 2q,

347

P.2d R62

•h1cr1 ""ent directly

( lq59), concerned cross-examination

to the basic issue of the case.

Here,

the restrict ion imposed on appellant's
was unrelated
"''''""'\',and unrelated

l 1n,'_i1s,

to the circumstances of the

to the witness's credibility.

Finally,

the

"definitive"

1011 11.s.

120

( jqf;RI,

is

position in Smith v.

limiterl to ascertaining the

i 11Pnt1ty and residence of a witness.

-s-

While explaining

that the threshold question of the witness's name and
is essential to further inquiry, the supreme Court recognizr"
the trial

judge's discretion in limiting cross-examination t··

relevant issues.

Id. at 131-133.

The Smith v.

Illinois

threshold is satisfied in the present case.
In order for appellant's inquiry concerning the
witness• s awareness of reports on mistaken ident if icat ion lo
be within the scope of permissible cross-examination,

inquiry must go to the credibility of the witness.

the

But the

cross-examination in question here had nothing to do with the
circumstances of the event.

Rather, Mr. Bullock was asked

whether he had read any newspaper articles or watched any
television programs dealing with eyewitness identification (1.
34).

Defense counsel claimed that such an inquiry "goes to

credibility" of the witness (T. 341, but established
absolutely no foundation to indicate that the possible viewing
of media reports on misidentification was relevant to the
witness's capacity to observe and identify appellant.

In

response to the prosecutor's object ion the judge stated:

am

am not sure at this point if it is relevant, counsel.
not sure of just where you are going."

( T.

3 4-35).

"I

Instead

of laying the requisite foundation of relevancy as
by the judge, defense counsel attempted to elicit the samP
information by merely rephrasing the question (T. 35).
Pursuant to the State's second objection the

judge replied:

"I am going to sustain it, counsel, at this point.
-fi-

If yuu

wish

to pursue the matter, discuss it at a later time, we will

• • •
tlie

But I am afraid it is going to go further than

rourt feels it should."

(T.

35}.

The trial judge has broad discretion in restricting
extent of cross-examination.

Even when he errs in

limiting cross-examination the error is not reversible unless
it is al so pre j ud ic i al.
438, 439

(1982); State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017

11978); state v.

rn

State v. Patterson, Utah, 656 P.2d

Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1977).

state v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975), this court

held that no prejudicial error resulted from a limitation on
croos-examination where the questions allowed adequately
explored the issue of credibility.

Appellant

in the present

case was given ample opportunity to fully explore the
witness's credibility.
This Court heard a similar fact situation and legal
claim in State v. Gill, 24 Utah 2d 261, 470 P.2d 250 (1970).
There the defendant contended the trial court prejudicially
limited the scope of the defense counsel's cross-examination
of the State's witness in regard to the basis of her
identification.

The cross-examination dealt with the

witness's ability to distinguish between Hispanics and Blacks,
•hen the real credibility issue concerned her ability to
11

st 1nguish between two Mexican brothers.

Finding that the

noss-examination extended to matters beyond the vital issues

-7-

of

the case, this rourt

held that

"the

ruling

nf

the

court did not have the effect of preventinq inquiry
import ant

and material

fact."

harmless error and did not
court's decision.
The

Id.

at 2s2.

tr1d]

into,,,

Any err()r

Justify reversal of the

Wd'.->

trid]

Id.

limitation on cross-examination

case must be suhject to the same analysis.

in the presc>nt

The viewing ot

media reports on misidentification does not go to the vital
issue of the case,

i.e., the credibility of the witness

in

distinguishing appellant from other-Hispanics and Rlacks.
Appellant

failed

relevancy

to extend the scope of cross-examination;

the

judge properly restricted

trial

issues.

to establish the requisite foundation of

the questions

therefore,

to relevant

No error resulted, and certainly no prejudicial errur

resulted upon which to

justify reversal.

The trial court's

restriction on cross-examination should be affirmed.

POINT II
SINCE THEPE HAS REEN NO
THAT THE
TPIAL COUPT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AP PELLANT' S MOTION FOR A CONTI NUANCE WAS
PROPERLY DENIED.
Appellant's motion for a continuance to locate an
absent witness, Ozzie Ahmed,

was properly denied.

allegedly saw a suspicious-looking vehicle near the Triangle
Service Station at 4200 South Highlanrl Drive--about
miles from the scene of the robbery.

-R-

Mr.

1 )12

Ahmerl told the

--attenc!ant who then reportecl
Later that evening,

,11..._·e.

fitting

31

the vehicle

to the

around 10:30 p.m., police stopped

the description of the vehicle

reported earlier.

",-,1efendant Ibrian Ortiz was one of three occupants (T.
8 q_ g11 I •

The trial
10

judge is free

to exercise sound discretion

ruling on a motion for a continuance and his decision will
reversed unless he clearly abuses his discretion.

state v. Creviston, Utah, li46

P.2d 750 ( lq82); State v.

Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975).
clarified that the trial
in

This Court recently

judge does not abuse his discretion

denying a continuance to procure testimony of an absent
unless the defendant has shown "that the testimony

sought is material and admissible,

that the witness could be

procluced within a reasonable time, and

that due diligence has

exercised before the request for a continuance."
v.

rreviston, li46 P.2d at 752.

See also State v.

''tah 29A, 119 P.2d 112 (1941); State v.
RS P. 447

State

Hartman, 101

Freshwater, 30 Utah

( 1906).

The cases cited by appellant

in support of his

ion are easily distinguished from the case at bar.

State

'.',Watson, Wash,, 419 P.2d 789 (1966), held that where diligent
efforts are made to locate a witness the continuance should be
1Cinted,
''ta
1

in

State v. Watson,

however,

involved an attempt to

testimony which was clearly material

to the key issue

self-defense, and thus within the standard set by this

-9-

Court in State v. Creviston.

The materiality of Ahmerl's

testimony to the present case is not as apparent.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.

14 ( 1967),

is citecl hy

appellant to support the proposition that the right to
a defense includes the right to offer witnesses'
to compel their attendance at trial.
however,

testimony

dM

In Washington v. Texas,

it was undisputed that the testimony sought was

relevant and material and vital to the defense.
Texas, 388 ll.S. at lli.

The supreme Court

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1981),

Washington v,

in United States v.
explicitly stated

that more than the mere absence of testimony is necessary to
establish a violation of the defendant's right to compulsory
process as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

A plausible

showing must be made that the absent testimony would have heen
relevant, material, and favorable to the defense.

Id. at R67.

Despite appellant's blanket claim that Mr. Ahmed's
testimony would have been material, the contention is
unsupported by the content of Mr. Ahmed's proffered testimony.
Mr. Ahmed merely told an attendant at a Triangle oil station
near the location of the robbery that he saw a
suspicious-looking vehicle.

That attendant reported the

vehicle to the police approximately ten minutes prior to
Quality Oil station robbery (T.

14, 69, 81-82).

No indicattY

is given that Mr. Ahmed actually saw who was in the vehicle "
that he could identify the occupants.

A vehicle fitting the

description of the report and containing three individuals

-10-

.,., as stopped

by a police officer 1 1/2 hours after the robbery

,10 ,1 nccured (T. 89-90).
amcing the

The co-defendant,

three, but appellant was not.

Ibrian Ortiz, was

Prom this scant

infonnation appellant draws the faulty conclusion that he
could not possibly have been with the co-defendant at any time
duriny the evening nor could he have participated in the
robb<e ry.

This conclusion frivolously disposes of any number

of events which could easily have occurred during the
unaccounted for two hours,
up with Mr. Ortiz

including appellant's having teamed

to commit the robbery.

at hest highly speculative, and

is not sufficient to support a

reversal of the trial court's decision.
the prospective witness'
inadmissible,
continuance."

such a conclusion is

"Where the content of

testimony is speculative or likely to

it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a

State v. Creviston, 64fi p, 2d at 752; see also

State v. Derum, 7fi Wash.

2d 26, 454 P.2d 424 (1969).

The record also contains evidence that due diligence
•as not exercised to secure the witness's testimony before the
request for a continuance (T. 76-77).

Appellant claims

knowledge of the witness did not arise until certain police
reports had been turned over by the State just one day prior
to the original trial date.

However,

two continuances were

JrantPd to appellant after he obtained the reports.

This

of several weeks provided ample time in which to study
reports and make the necessary arrangements to ensure Mr.
presence at trial.

Failure to do so is evidence of

-11-

failure to exercise the diligence necessary to ohtain a
continuance.

Appellant has not shown an abuse of rliscret ,, '·

by the trial

judge according to the tltah standard expressen '"

State v. Creviston.

Therefore, the trial court's rulinq un

the motion for a continuance shoulrl be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support appellant's conviction, and neither the proper
restriction of cross-examination nor rhe denial to grant a
continuance constitutes reversible error.

Therefore,

appellant's conviction should be
RESPECTFULLY sutrnitted this

c!}.D

day of June, 19R4.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid to Brooke
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Wells,
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Utah 84111, this

of June, 19R4.
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